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CURRENT LEGALDEVELOPMENTS
The Authority of States to Use Names in
International Law and theMacedonian
Affair: Unilateral Entitlements, Historic
Title, and Trademark Analogies
ILIAS BANTEKAS∗
Abstract
The international legal entitlement by which a state constitutionally designates its name, or
a province therein, involves a unilateral act. Where, however, another state wishes to choose
the same appellation, as is the casewith the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia (FYROM),
the matter can only be resolved by reference to the first user and the maxim prior in tempore
potior in jure. The first user must provide evidence of continuous use and of protest in those
cases where the same appellationwas appropriated by a third state. Under such circumstances
the entitlement becomes exclusive, rather than concurrent, because the prior user may be
said to possess a sound historic title, such that has been recognized by international judicial
bodies to determine acquisition of territory, effective administration, historic bays, and so on.
The exclusivity of the entitlement is further reinforced by analogy with general principles
derived from the law of trademarks. At a practical level, the application of the international
law of geographical indications clearly demonstrates that the designation ‘Macedonia’ cannot
be used for a significant number of products originating in FYROM, since the Greek province
of Macedonia has for a long time branded and registered such products. This will create
insurmountable problems for producers in FYROMwhen they try to brand their goods under
the country’s constitutional name. A change of name, particularly through the compromisory
use of a compound, would alleviate legal, political, and financial concerns.
Keywords
geographic designation; historic title; Macedonia; prior use; unilateral acts
1. INTRODUCTION
Withthebreak-upofYugoslavia someof the federal statescontainedwithin it sought
to claim statehood. Many complexities arose out of this claim, not least because it
touched on issues of territory, succession with respect to property and liabilities,
recognition by other states, and others. In this regard, the territorial basis on which
third states were willing to recognize these new entities as sovereign states in their
∗ Professor of International Law, Brunel Law School; Head of International Law & Arbitration, Mourgelas
& Associates LLP (Athens). The author wishes to thank Professor Achilleas Skordas, Bristol University, for
reading and commenting on an earlier draft. Full responsibility remains with the author.
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own right was that which existed and was constitutionally recognized while these
were federal states within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).1 This
formula – that is, the retention of prior constitutional borders – ensures continuity
and the least possibility of complaints, is certainly the least demanding, and was
successfully applied in the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; and it
was upon thismodel that the referendumon the secession of Quebecwas premised.
It was not, therefore, surprising that the same tested formula was followed in the
case of the seceding Republic of Macedonia from the SFRY, at least with regard to
its territory. Although that republic’s status as a state was not in question after the
disintegration of the SFRY,2 the ensuing interstate dispute which arose between
Greece and this new state, concerning predominantly the use of ‘Macedonia’ as its
constitutional name, contributed to friction with respect to its recognition3 under
this constitutional name and the country’s application for membership of inter-
national organizations.4 In 1993 ‘Macedonia’ was admitted to the United Nations
andwasprovisionally referred to for all legal andotherpurposesof thatorganization
as the ‘former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia’ (FYROM), pending settlement of the
differences over the new republic’s name.5
Thevastmajorityof legalcommentatorstakingthetimetodevotesomewisdomto
the issue took the view, on the onehand, that thematter is not regulated by a general
rule of international law, claiming, therefore, that the name of a state is exclusively
an issue of domestic jurisdiction overwhich no other entity can proffer any counter
demands.6 Others, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned
1 The view that the principle of uti possidetis be applied to internationalize former administrative boundaries
in the case of the SFRY was adopted by the EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia and subsequently
affirmed by the EC member states. See M. Craven, ‘The European Community Arbitration Commission on
Yugoslavia’, (1995) 66 BYIL 333, at 335.
2 C.Warbrick, ‘Recognition of States: Part 2’, (1993) 42 ICLQ 433, at 438.
3 Greece imposed an embargo on FYROM on 16 February 1994 on the basis of then Art. 224 of the EC Treaty.
The EC Commission subsequently commenced proceedings against Greece before the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) on the grounds that the embargo hindered Community trade and distorted competitionwithin
the EU. Commission v. Hellenic Republic, Case C-120/94R, [1994] ECR I-3037. The Advocate-General, Mr Jacobs,
sided with Greece’s invocation of Art. 224 by arguing that ‘where a government and people are fervently
convinced that a foreign state is usurping a part of their cultural patrimony and has long-term designs on a
part of their national territory, it would be difficult to say that war is such an unlikely hypothesis that the
threat of war can be excluded altogether’. The Commission subsequently dropped the case before reaching
the merits stage, while Greece concluded an Interim Accord with FYROM on 13 September 1995, infra note
9. See C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki, A Legal and Political Interpretation of Articles 224 and 225 of the Treaty of
Rome: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Cases (1997).
4 Initially Greek claims centred on particular provisions of the FYROM constitution, which together with
the use of the name ‘Macedonia’, it argued, implied territorial claims against Greece. This was subsequently
remedied by the FYROMAssembly on 6 January 1992 with the amendment of the constitution through two
constitutional acts which provided that FYROM had no territorial claims against neighbouring countries
and no intention of changing its borders, and that it would not interfere in the sovereign or other internal
affairs of other states. However, it is the usurpation of the name ‘Macedonia’, with all its cultural and
historic attributes, towhichGreecewas, and is, opposed. SeeGreekMemorandum to theUNConcerning the
Application of FYROM for Admission to the United Nations, UN Doc. A/47/877-S/25158 (25 Jan 1993). See I.
Janev, ‘Legal Aspects of theUse of a ProvisionalName forMacedonia in theUnitedNations System’, (1999) 93
AJIL 155, at 159. On the basis of the amendments the EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia stated that
‘the use of the nameMacedonia cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against another state’. Opinion
No. 6, (1992) 31 ILM 1507, at 1511. This article does not examine the validity of these territorial claims.
5 SC Res. 817 (7 April 1993); GA Res. 47/225 (8 April 1993).
6 Application of FYROM for membership to the United Nations, UN Doc. A/47/876-S/25147, cited and com-
mented on in Janev, supranote 4, at 159; for a similar view see L.Henkin, R. C. Pugh,O. Schachter, andH. Smit,
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with crisismanagement and conflict prevention, took the view that the recognition
of a non-Greek ‘Macedonian’ identity that encompasses the current population
of FYROM constitutes a foundation for the stability of that country.7 This stability
objectivewas elevated to apolitical imperative, againstwhichhistoric title, national
sensitivities,andactualdamageall tooksecondstage.Onesuchorganizationasserted
that
The historical region of Macedonia indeed forms an important part of the Greek
identity. But however important ancient Macedonia may be to Greeks, there is an
objective difference: Greece does not depend on the nameMacedonia as the exclusive
signifier of the Greek identity.8
In 1995 the two countries entered into an Interim Agreement, the purpose of
which was to facilitate their bilateral economic and political relations until a final
agreement on the name was reached. Until such time, the newly emerged state was
bound touse thenameFYROMin its international relations and to remove, inter alia,
thosesymbols fromitsflagwhichrelatedtoancientartefactsexcavated inGreeceand
whichwere traditionallyconsideredbyGreece tobe itsownnational symbols.9 Since
then a number of mediation efforts have failed to yield results, particularly because
FYROMhas rejected the incorporationof a compoundnext to thename ‘Macedonia’,
which, althoughstronglyunpopularwith theGreekpublic, successivegovernments
of the latter have been willing to accommodate as a compromise solution. During
the latest roundsofnegotiations inFebruary2008, theGreekgovernment reaffirmed
its commitment that a potential solution must be based on a win–win formula for
bothparties for the sakeof goodneighbourliness and regional stability, andnodoubt
this is also what the people of both countries are seeking. The positive signs offered
by some states convinced the government of FYROM that it would be admitted into
NATO and the European Union, despite Greek reservations. As a result of FYROM’s
intransigence over this proposed compromise and of general hostility towards US
expansion ofNATO to includeUkraine andGeorgia, themajority ofNATOmembers
generally supported the Greek claim and upheld the veto against admission of
FYROM until such time as ‘a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has
been reached’.10 There still are a lot of uncertainties swirling around these recent
developments. It is not wholly clear whether Greece has violated its obligation
under Article 11 of the 1995 Interim Agreement not to obstruct the admission of
International Law: Cases and Materials (1993), 253 and M. Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav
Republic and Issues of Statehood’, (1995) 16Australian Yearbook of International Law 199; nonetheless, while it
is true that states are free, under international law, to pursue certain unilateral acts in accordance with their
municipal law, particularly in matters of nationality and maritime delimitation, the validity of these acts
with respect to other states depends ultimately upon international law. SeeUK v. Norway (Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries), (1951) ICJ Rep. 116, at 132, and Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm), (1955) ICJ Rep. 4, at 20–1.
7 ICG, ‘Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It’, ICG Balkans Report No. 122, 10
December 2001, 1–2, 12.
8 Ibid., at 16.
9 UN Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM of 13 September 1995, available at
www.hri.org/docs/fyrom/95-27866.html, Art. 7(2)–(3).
10 Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2008)049 (3 April 2008), point 20, available at
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html
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FYROM to international organizations in which it is a party, on account of the fact
that the government of that country has not made any compromise in order to
resolve the name issue since signing the Interim Agreement. This is no easy task,
however, as the internal political pressures on both governments over this issue
are overwhelming; it is certainly an issue over which elections are lost and won.
Equally, despite the recorded statements by the Greek minister of foreign affairs
that Greece would not support FYROM’s application to join NATO unless concrete
commitments weremade to resolve the dispute over the name, there is no concrete
evidence that Greece alone vetoed this application. This is particularly true given
that NATO adheres to a strict policy of secrecy as regards member states’ voting
choices. These diverging views on the meaning and the scope of the 1995 Interim
Agreement led the government of FYROM to lodge an application against Greece
in late 2008 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that Greece had
violated Article 11 of the 1995 Interim Agreement by blocking FYROM’s entry into
NATO.11 The application does not deal with the entitlement issue over the disputed
nameandit isnotexpectedthattheWorldCourtwilladdressthismatterevenasobiter
dicta. Despite my aforementioned positions, FYROM’s application before the ICJ is
notwithoutmerit, and theCourt should consider carefully the specificity of positive
obligations assumedby states in their quest for peace-buildingmeasures. Greece has
generally failed to take the initiative in making FYROM feel like a ‘neighbour’ –
unlikeGreek investorswhohave invested heavily in the country, expecting that the
situation would be defused through the negotiating process.
Following the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008, the matter is once again ripe for
new rounds of negotiations. The case pending before the ICJ should act as a catalyst
for a concrete solution. For the purposes of this article it should be noted, however,
that all the mediating and negotiating processes thus far have failed to address
the issue through the lens of international law; rather, their focus has been purely
political. This approach would have been fine had politics provided a solution, but
it seems only to have protracted discussions and given rise to a stalemate. This is
perhapsagood lessonvis-a`-vis theaversion to international legal solutions in respect
of international mediating efforts.
An absence of full knowledge of the relevant issues is evident in the international
legal literature, aswell as anunderstandable political bias in favour of theunderdog,
without, however, there being any clearmethodology or persuasive arguments that
conformto international legal standards orhistorical title. Theomissionof the latter
in the relevant literature is striking. The present analysis is quintessentially legal. It
seeks to discern the existence of a legal entitlement pertaining to appellations and
symbols by a resort to the concept of historic title, whether through multilateral,
bilateral, or unilateral acts. It goes on to show the relevance of the maxim prior
in tempore potior in jure with a view to determining a right of protest by the first
11 Application of 17 November 2008, FYROM v. Greece, Dispute Concerning the Implementation of Article
11(1) of the InterimAccord of 13 September 1995, available atwww.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/14879.pdf. By
a subsequent Order issued on 20 January 2009, the ICJ fixed the time limits for the submission ofmemorials
and counter-memorials.
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user.We then examine theprobative significance of historic evidence as amethodof
international law,whichmustcertainlybethesinequanoncriterionforascertaining
theexistenceornotofhistoric title.Equally,weassess the legalnatureofappellations
and symbols by attempting an analogy with the general principles of trademarks,
which bear a close resemblance to the principal purposes of names and symbols.
It is also without doubt that the trademark analogy gives rise to serious questions
of damage or harm to the entity with a long-standing legal entitlement. In closing
this introduction, the author was conscious that the legal framework of the name
dispute could have been argued on the basis of the principle of self-determination.
Nonetheless, given the existence of two conflicting claims, any such analysis of
self-determinationwould have necessarily referred back to the foundational origins
of these claims – that is, historic title.
2. CONCEPTUALIZING THE LEGAL ENTITLEMENT TO A NAME:
UNILATERAL ACTS AND PROTESTS
Statesclaimrightsandprerogativeschieflyfromtheprimarysourcesof international
law – that is, treaties and custom. These contain rights that are directly conferred on
the state entities concerned and, depending onparticipation in the treaty or custom-
ary rule, rights conferred may be global, regional, or bilateral. Equally, depending
on the scope of the right, this could be narrow, wide, qualified, or other. Whether
through treaty or custom, the fundamental criterion for the conferral of rights is
consent, in terms of both conferral and acceptance. States can, however, also accrue
rights to themselves on the basis of unilateral action. This is possible under strict
circumstances, and in every case unilateral acts and declarations can produce legal
effects only where they genuinely represent the will of the particular state. Such
unilateral acts comprise behaviour on the basis of which states assume obligations
(such as promises),12 acts by which a state waives a right or a legal claim,13 acts by
which a state reaffirms a right or a legal claim (such as recognition),14 and silence
and estoppel as principles modifying some state acts.15 It is within the realm of
unilateral acts, therefore, that the right of a country to lay claim to a name must
necessarily fall. At this point we should also distinguish between three very differ-
ent propositions or questions. (i) The first concerns claims to the name as a result
of a legitimate entitlement, or opposing counterclaim, stemming from a unilateral
act. This is fundamentally a legal question. (ii) The second proposition relates to
the relevance of historic claims by either of the disputing entities and the possible
outcome were one claim significantly to outweigh the other. Although prima facie
this is merely a historical proposition, if international law were somehow to give
weight, between two competing claims, to the one with the greatest reliance on
historical title, it follows that this is also a legal question. (iii) Finally, even if the first
12 ILC, 7th Report on Unilateral Acts of States, UN Doc. A/CN.4/542 (22 April 2004), 7–43.
13 Ibid., 44–8.
14 Ibid., 48–70.
15 Ibid., 72–8.
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twoquestionswere resolved in favour ofGreece – that is, the country that is opposed
to the ‘appropriation’ and use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by FYROM – the existence
of FYROM as a sovereign state entity is not legally affected. Equally, recognition of
this country under the name ‘Macedonia’ by other states produces legal effects as
to the name between the various states concerned, irrespective of the outcomes in
questions (i) and (ii) above.
Jurisprudence suggests that international judicial bodies have resorted to two
standards in order to ascertain whether the existence of a particular claim is com-
pliant with international law. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
contended that a statemay validly lay claim to a particular type of jurisdiction (and
hence to a legal entitlement) where no other rule of international law is opposed
to it.16 The opposite test is self-evident. Although the Lotus judgment was rightly
criticized on numerous grounds, its proposition is sound and logical, otherwise
no action would ever be taken internationally until such time as a large number
of states decided either to enter into a treaty or otherwise mutually to act in a
consistent and uniform manner in order to produce a customary rule. Unilateral
action is therefore welcome and permissible, provided that it does not conflict with
an existing rule of international law. In the present case, two legal impediments
preclude the use by FYROM of the name ‘Macedonia’ and relevant symbols. The
first concerns the official use of the name and symbols by Greece prior to their
appropriation by the FYROM authorities, while the second impediment relates to
the fact that Greece has always protested against the use of the name ‘Macedonia’
during the republic’s tenure as a federated republic of the SFRY and later on as an
independent state. The Lotus test necessarily implies that a unilateral claim will
fail only where an existing counterclaim or rule is of a legal rather than of a moral
quality and texture. Amoral claim could never trump a legal claim, except in those
exceptionally rare circumstances where to do otherwise would contravene all no-
tions of justice – although it is doubtful that there exists universal agreement on this
point. Consequently, Greece’s claim of prior use must satisfy the requirements per-
taining to a legal claim; that is, it must be an act producing legal effects. Although
it is true that Greece’s official designation is the Hellenic Republic and thus the
name ‘Macedonia’ does not feature in it, according to its constitution it is split into
several administrative regions, one of which is Macedonia. Following the Balkan
Wars of 1912–13 and the assumption of sovereignty over a large part of the geo-
graphical region of Macedonia that formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire, the
Greek government immediately adopted Law No. 524 in 1914,17 Article 1 of which
stated,
The new countries, except for Epirus and the Aegean islands, are divided adminis-
tratively into General Administrative Units and Prefectures; Macedonia, Epirus and
the Aegean islands can be subdivided [apart from prefectures] into sub-administrative
16 France v. Turkey (Lotus), (1927) PCIJ Reports, Ser. A, No. 10.
17 LawNo.524OnAdministrativeDivisionandAdministrationof theNewCountries,published inGovernment
Gazette of the Hellenic Kingdom, vol. 404(A) of 31 December 1914.
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units.. . .Thessaloniki andChaniaaredefinedas the seatsof theGeneralAdministrative
Units ofMacedonia and Crete, respectively. (Emphasis added.)
Given that this Greek normative designation, as well as a multitude of others,18
far precedes the post-SecondWorldWar Constitution of the SFRY, Greece officially
made use of the name well before its neighbouring entities, even though this en-
titlement was also available to them at that time. One could, however, argue that
a domestic law is capable of producing only internal, as opposed to external or in-
ternational, legal effects and does not therefore fall within the Lotus rule, whereas
the use of the name by FYROM relates to this country’s international relations
and is therefore the only relevant unilateral act of usage producing international
legal effects. This position is untenable because domestic laws are no less purely
domestic acts than are declarationsmade by government entities, or speeches given
by prime ministers and ministers before their national parliaments. To the extent
that such documents or actions are intended by their authors to, and do in fact,
produce legal effects in the international sphere, such instruments are international
in nature and binding upon their authors. Domestic laws offer evidence, in any
event, for ascertaining state practice in particular areas of law. It is clear, there-
fore, that in its international relations with third states, Greece had through its
domestic laws unilaterally laid primary claim to the use of the name ‘Macedonia’.
The fact that such designation referred only to a province, rather than to the coun-
try as a whole, does not limit other unilateral claims only as to provinces, since
the use of the name to designate an entire country, as is the case with FYROM,
creates legal effects for FYROM which conflict with Greece’s pre-existing legal
entitlement.
Greek protests over the use of the contested name by its neighbour constitute
an additionally persuasive legal argument and a good example of a unilateral act
producing legal effects.19 A protest is a negative act, in that it purports not to set
a new paradigm, but simply to negate the existence of a claim made by another
state. It is a formal act of objection by which the protesting state declares its intent
not to be bound by an act of another state, and/or an intent not to recognize or
acquiesce in the legal validity of such an act. The ICJ has consistently held that for
a protest to be successful (i) it must immediately follow the act against which the
protest is lodged;20 (ii) the act or actions that constitute the protestmust historically
18 Aseries of executiveordersweremadeby theGovernor-General ofMacedonia (i.e. theGreekState) from1914
onwards,asampleofwhichiscontainedinMuseumoftheMacedonianStruggleFoundation(eds.),Macedonia:
A Greek Term in Modern Usage (2005), 29–31. Other laws concerning Macedonia were also promulgated in
the immediate aftermath of the SecondWorldWar, such as Emergency LawNo. 208 to Establish the General
AdministrationofNorthernGreece,Art. 1 ofwhich encompassed therein ‘the general administrativeunits of
WesternMacedonia, Central Macedonia, EasternMacedonia and Thrace’, published in Government Gazette
Vol. 65, 21 March 1945; equally, Law No. 92 on the Reinstatement of the General Administrative Units
and Abolition of Government Representatives, Art. 1 of which reinstated the General Administration of
Macedonia, published in Government Gazette Vol. 13 of 20 January 1945. During the interwar period the
Greek government had established a variety of public institutions that included the name ‘Macedonia’, such
as the Agricultural Bank of Macedonia, the Supreme Administration of the Gendarmerie of Macedonia and
others.
19 See I. C.McGibbon, ‘SomeObservations on the Part of Protest in International Law’, (1953) 30British Yearbook
of International Law 298.
20 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, supra note 6, at 131.
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accompany the contested unilateral act;21 (iii) the protest must be consistent and
uninterrupted;22 and (iv) the intent of the protesting state must be to prevent the
emergence or recognition of a legal entitlement by another state. In the case at hand,
it is onlyoneparty, namelyGreece, that is claiming theexistenceof anuninterrupted
historic title that stems from its domestic law arrangements. Given that at the time
the laws of themodernGreek state, following the conclusion of the FirstWorldWar,
incorporated the province of Macedonia into Greek territory, ‘Macedonia’ existed
neither as an independent state entity nor as a constitutionally recognized region
within the thenKingdomof theSerbs,Croats, andSlovenes (theKingdom), it follows
that thefirst historic title claimant isGreece. There is no record of theKingdomor of
Bulgaria ever protesting against Greece’s designation of its northern regionwith the
nameMacedonia.Equally,whenthepost-SecondWorldWarconstitutionof theSFRY
named its southernmost province Macedonia in order to consolidate the plethora
of ethnic groups inhabiting that region, Greece protested against this action and at
the same time took some domestic steps that clearly demonstrated its objection to
the use of the name for any legal purpose. Thus Greece has consistently refused to
recognize the so-called ethnicMacedonianminority inGreece.23 It is not thatGreece
refuses to recognize the distinct characteristics of this group, particularly its use of a
Slavicdialect;onthecontrary, theGreekstatedoesnotaccept thegroup’sdesignation
asMacedonians because thatwould conflictwith its constitutional –not tomention
historical – tradition whereby it has already designated the characterization of
‘Macedonian’ to its Greek population living in the province of Macedonia.24 Greece
has refused to recognize this language as a distinct Macedonian language for the
same reasons, as will be demonstrated in the following section.
Having analysed the validity and legal nature of unilateral acts and their actors’
claims concerning theproductionof legal effects,wehavedemonstrated thatGreece
was the first of the two contesting entities to use the name Macedonia in order to
designate as such a distinct part of its territory. The prior in tempore potior in jure
maxim therefore justifies the first-in-time user’s exclusive use of the name and
its protest against any other entity usurping it. It is equally evident that Greece’s
protests against the use of the name within the SFRY (and later on when the break-
away republic became known as FYROM), which included both oral statements and
positive action, satisfy the aforementioned criteria giving legal credence and effect
to the protests. Greece’s protests against the contested appellation from the time
this name was introduced in the SFRY and later when FYROM became a sovereign
21 El Salvador v. Honduras (Land, Island andMaritime Frontier Dispute), (1992) ICJ Rep. 351, 577, para. 364.
22 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, supra note 6, at 138;USA v. Mexico (Chamizal arbitration), (1911) 5 AJIL 807.
23 H. Poulton,Who Are the Macedonians? (2000), 171.
24 Greece’s record on the protection of its minorities is generally poor. This is true also of its slavophone
minority on which it imposed numerous unnecessary and harsh linguistic and other penalties in the
mistaken belief that such measures would foster assimilation. Nonetheless, the European Court of Human
Rights inSidiropoulos et al. v. Greece, 4 ECHR (1998) 500, didnot attempt to answer the question as towhether a
distinct ethnicMacedonianminority should be recognized at a timewhen theGreek population of northern
Greece is already designated as Macedonian. The Court clearly suggested, however, in paras. 37–39 that the
intention to dispute ‘the Greek identity ofMacedonia and its inhabitants and undermine Greece’s territorial
integrity’ constitutes a legitimate interference in the right of association (Art. 11 ECHR) with the aim of
protecting national security and preventing disorder.
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state can probably also be described as persistent objections.25 Let us now examine
the legal relevance, if any, of legal claims arising out of historic title.
3. THE HISTORIC TITLE CLAIM
During the course of the twentieth centurymany an opportunity arose for states to
argue that in particular instances they had a legal entitlement as a result of some
historic or original title.26 Litigation over the existence of such a title concerned
mainly rights to land territory or waters, historic bays, and others. In attempting
to discern the legal nature of historic titles, it has been suggested that one should
not be guided by private law analogies such as estoppel or prescription, but instead
rely on state acquiescence or consent. As such, historic rights constitute a particular
type of custom which deviates from what would normally be the applicable rule
were it not for the lapse of time and the maxim of quieta non movere.27 Indeed,
in this sense the customary rule that comes into being between the interested
entities involves a bilateral or trilateral custom, which is the case for historic bays
or title to territory. It is undeniable, however, that estoppel, or the lack thereof,
plays a significant part in the formation of such a customary rule, because in the
circumstancesathand itoperateseither todenoteor to removeconsent. Inanyevent,
the fact remains that inmanypartsof theworld theconsolidationof landboundaries
through ancient or historic traditional title remains paramount.28 The same is not
necessarily true with regard to historic bays.29 It should be noted, however, that
the reason why historic title to bays is disputed is because the matter is resolved
to a significant degree by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and by the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).30 Equally, although historic
title to bays is not disputed per se, the historical evidence required to prove its
existence, coupledwith the usual requirements of customary law, has prevented the
ICJ from adopting a uniform rule applicable in all relevant cases. As a result, the ICJ
has made it clear that claims to historic titles over bays are subject to ad hoc legal
25 The rule on consistent objection is very important in this case, as it would determine whether a state
may be estopped of its historical claims. See generally J. I. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the
Development of Customary International Law’ (1985) 56 British Yearbook of International Law 1. It has been
argued that Greece’s present opposition to the use of this particular name possibly contradicts its previous
attitude when it adopted the 16 December 1991 ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union’, European Political Cooperation (EPC) Documentation Bulletin No. 91/464,
16 December 1991. Since the adoption of these Guidelines was only intended to formulate a common EC
external policy on recognition it cannot be inferred that through its consent Greece tacitly accepted later
claims on the issue of the name. See A. Peters, ‘Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic
Republic’, (1995) 89 AJIL 376, at 383.
26 In El Salvador v. Honduras, supra note 21, para. 45, the ICJ confirmed that the term ‘title’ encompasses not
only documentary evidence, but also ‘any evidence which may establish the existence of a right, and the
actual source of that right’.
27 Y. Z. Blum,Historic Titles in International Law (1965).
28 See K. Kaikobad, ‘Some Observations on the Doctrine of Finality and Continuity of Boundaries’, (1983) 54
British Yearbook of International Law 119, 130–2.
29 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2003), 158.
30 (1982) 21 ILM 1245. Even so, Art. 10(6) of UNCLOS, which regulates the delimitation of bays, states that the
entirety of Art. 10 does not apply to historic bays.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Mar 2014 IP address: 134.83.1.242
572 ILIAS BANTEKAS
regimes determined by their particular circumstances,31 whichmay, as in theGulf of
Fonseca case, turn out to be a pluri-state historic bay subject to a particular species of
threefold sovereignty.32 Despite the limited application of historic titles due to the
detailed regulation of UNCLOS, the Convention itself is not blind to the fact that
some facets relating to the law of the sea are still best regulated by reference not to
the general rule established each time byUNCLOS, but instead byhistoric title, such
as that regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite
or adjacent coastlines.33 A particular, but not markedly different, variant of historic
title is the so-called historical consolidation of title. Its contemporary origins lie
in the ICJ’s judgment delivered in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, according to
which the Norwegian use of straight baselines since 1869, which itself had received
general toleration, was ‘the basis of an historical consolidation which would make
it enforceable against all States’.34
Ascertainingtheoriginandownershipofspecific ‘culturalelements’undoubtedly
requires a historical examination of facts, something which we have demonstrated
is hardly new in interstate litigation.35 Historic title is of twofold significance in
the current context. First, one should examine the practice of the disputing states
themselves from the moment the Macedonian region came into their hands. The
crucial period in this regard is 1913, at which time the region was ceded to Greece,
Bulgaria, and Serbia following the defeat of the Ottoman armed forces. The relevant
position since 1913 of FYROM’s predecessor, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes – and Bulgaria, where this is territorially relevant – is equally important.
The period from 1913 to the present day will provide evidence as to the legality
of unilateral entitlement claims on the basis of the prior in tempore potior in jure
rule, as well as the existence of counterclaims on the basis of protest. The period
prior to 1913 is also equally important because, much like ‘usage’ in the case of
historic bays, although the region was not in the hands of either of the contesting
states, the treatment of the region as Greek or otherwise by the Ottomans or other
empires before them helps to clarify the contemporary arguments of the parties.
In the present case it is undisputed that the inhabitants of Macedonia were an
ancientGreek tribewho spoke one of the oldest forms ofGreek,which had affinities
with the Aeolian, Arcado-Cypriot, and Mycenean dialects. The most renowned of
these ancient Macedonians, King Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander the
Great, acted, not as a distinct and non-Greek tribal people, but as a pan-Hellenic
movement with the aim of uniting all the Greek city states.36 The fact that the
ancient Macedonians were self-identified as Greeks and viewed as such by other
31 Tunisia v. Libya (Continental Shelf), (1982) ICJ Rep. 18, paras. 98–107; El Salvador v. Honduras, supra note 21,
paras. 404 ff.
32 El Salvador v. Honduras, supra note 21.
33 UNCLOS, Art. 15.
34 Anglo-Norwegians Fisheries, supra note 6, at 138.
35 The historic method is extensively used in interstate disputes concerning title to territory. In theMinquiers
and Ecrehos case ((1953) ICJ Rep. 47), for example, the ICJ examined the history of the islands as far back
as 1066 AD. Ancient historical title was also claimed by Yemen in its case against Eritrea. Eritrea v. Yemen,
Boundary Commission Decision (13 April 2002), (2002) 41 ILM 1057.
36 Institute of International, Political and Strategic Studies (eds.), TheMacedonian Affair (1997), 7, citing among
others the German historian Johann Gustav Droysen.
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Greek city states is attested by ancient historians, such as Herodotus and Strabo, as
well as by engravings in tombs, as epigraphs, and on coins, among others, excavated
in Macedonia, all of which were written in Greek. Strong Greek presence in the
geographical area of Macedonia continued even after the appearance of Slavs and
Bulgars in the sixth and seventh centuries AD.37
Following the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and subsequent fragment-
ation, no mention was made of a ‘Macedonian’ people and no such claims were
made in an ethnic context.38 The British were monitoring the region and their
consul in the 1860s reported that the slavophone population were designated as
Bulgarians.39 It must be understood that at the time the former subjects of the Otto-
man Empire did not determine their identity on the basis of ethnicity, but primarily
on grounds of religion and language. Given that all Christians were subject to the
authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, which was the universal
beacon of Greek language and orthodoxy, the Greek authorities complacently be-
lieved that slavophone Macedonians were equally happy with this arrangement,
particularly since the impoverished slavophone rural populations bore the burden
of financial demands from local bishops subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarch.40
The new Bulgarian state capitalized on this dissatisfaction and in 1870 legalized
the status of the Bulgarian Exarchate Church, and thus offered a new alternative
to the slavophones of the region with a view to cultivating a Bulgarian national
consciousness. In 1891 the British Foreign Office conducted a survey of the lin-
guistic and ethnic composition of the region of Western Macedonia, making no
mention of a distinct Macedonian ethnicity, but instead pointing out that some
slavophones had indeed began to assert a Bulgarian ethnic identity.41 It is telling
that not even the principal Macedonian slavophone paramilitary organization, the
EMEO, asserted the existence of a distinctMacedonian ethnic groupor social class.42
This is only natural, since neither the 1878 Treaty of Berlin,43 nor the 1878 Treaty
of San Stefano,44 which it revoked, made any reference to such an ethnic group.
This lack of reference to a Macedonian ethnicity, or of claims thereto, continued
even in the aftermath of the First World War in the context of bilateral population
transfer treaties, particularly the 1919 Neuilly Treaty between the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers and Bulgaria,45 nor was there any such mention in the reports of any
37 Ibid., citing the French historian Paul Lemerle.
38 Ibid., 8, citing Lord Salisbury who, as British representative at the Congress of Berlin, stated in his address of
19 June 1878 that ‘Macedonia and Thrace are as Greek as Crete’.
39 Parliamentary Papers – Accounts and Papers (PPAP), Vol. 75 (1867), 607.
40 Ibid., Vol. 67 (1861), 512, and Vol. 75 (1867), 618–19.
41 FO Public Records, FO Doc. 195/1849, Shipley to Blunt (Monastir, 31 March 1984), 103–7.
42 V. K. Gounaris, ‘The slavophones of Macedonia’, in K. Tsitselikis and D. Hristopoulos (eds.), The Minority
Phenomenon in Greece (1997), 83–4.
43 Treaty betweenGreat Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey for the Settlement
of the Affairs of the East, signed at Berlin on 13 July 1878, contained in A. Oakes and R. B. Mowat (eds.), The
Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century (1918), 332–60.
44 Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano on 3 March 1878, in ibid., at
377–90.
45 Available atwww.hri.org/docs/fyrom/95-27866.html. In fact, Arts. 46 and 54 of this treaty, which concern the
obligation to protect minorities on the territory of Greece and Bulgaria respectively, refer only to linguistic,
racial, and religious minorities and not to ethnic minorities. Nor indeed is there any mention of an ethnic
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governmentornon-governmententities. In1924GreeceandBulgariaadoptedabilat-
eral protocol (the so-called Politis-Kalfof Protocol), by which Greece acknowledged
that the slavophonesofWesternMacedonia constituted aBulgarianminority.46 This
was an altogether foolish decision, given that many slavophones in the region had
by that time openly professed a Greek ethnic identity and had taken part in the
Balkanwars against Bulgaria. Serbia took advantage of the turmoilwithin theGreek
slavophone Macedonian community, requesting from Greece its recognition as a
Serbian, rather than a Bulgarian, minority.47 Until the rise of Tito in Yugoslavia no
mention was ever made of ‘Macedonians’ as a distinct ethnic group. In fact Tito did
not believe in the existence of a non-Greek Macedonian identity, but had no alter-
native but to concoct one or risk ethnic tensions in the southernmost region of his
country.48
It is thus clear that the name ‘Macedonia’ has, since antiquity, been employed
to designate a geographic location and not a distinct ethnic or national group as
such. This conclusion is also confirmed, under the weight of historic evidence,
through the interpretative communities theory, which articulates the notion that
within an institutional setting the various actors share common assumptions and
beliefs (interpretative community), such that themeaning of a text or of a concept is
constrainedbyprovidingtheassumptionsandunderstandingrelatingtothepractice
athand.49 In thepresentcase, it is evident that the internationalcommunitybetween
1860 and 1940 had not conceived, nor was it a recipient of claims concerning, the
existence of a distinct Macedonian ethnicity.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is composed of a variety of ethnic
groups: Slavs,Albanians,Vlachs,Greeks, andothers.Thesemulti-ethnicpopulations
with a plethora of languages and dialects do not come within the historic meaning
identifiedwith the term ‘Macedonian’, except through their geographical inclusion
in the greater region of Macedonia. The modern state of FYROM, therefore, does
not constitute an extension of ancient Macedonian history, whether in terms of
language or ethnicity.50 On the sole basis, nonetheless, that it does occupy part
of the wider geographical region of Macedonia, it may be argued that the use of
the name ‘Macedonia’ by FYROM is permissible, but only insofar as this is used to
designate its geographical location. For reasons already explained in our analysis
of historic title, the name ‘Macedonia’ cannot be used to designate the ethnicity
Macedonian group in the 1913 Bucharest Peace Treaty between Romania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and
Greece, which related to those countries’ borders following the conclusion of the FirstWorldWar, available
at www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos149.htm.
46 Unpublished, on file with the author.
47 Gounaris, supra note 42, at 96–7. Despite the subsequent refusal by the Greek parliament to ratify the
Politis-Kalfof Protocol, the justified disillusionment of the Greek slavophone population was hard to repair.
48 E. Koufos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation (1987), 3–4. Tito’s intentions in this regard are
generally undisputed.
49 S. Fish, Is There a Text in the Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities (1982); I. Johnstone, ‘Security
Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument’, (2003) 14 EJIL 437, at 444.
50 The first president of FYROM, Kiro Gligorov, stated that ‘We are Slavs who came to this area in the sixth
century . . . we are not descendants of the ancient Macedonians.’ Foreign Information Service Daily Report,
EasternEurope, 26 February 1992, 35; statements to the same effectwere printed in theToronto Star, 15March
1992.
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or language of the people of FYROM, given that the term ‘Macedonia’ had never
in the past been used to designate a distinct ethnic group. Equally, on account of
Greece’s use of the term ‘Macedonia’ to define constitutionally part of its territory,
and given its unopposed historic title in this regard, FYROM cannot reasonably
expect that itmay employ this particular designation as the name of the country on
incidental geographical grounds. As will be explained in the next section, FYROM
can expect, at best, that the term ‘Macedonia’ may be employed, but only where
this is qualified in order to avoid confusion between the two entities and their
various ethnic, linguistic, and other traditions. Nonetheless, this is a matter for
negotiation and is by nomeans an automatic entitlement. Several suggestions were
proffered in the past as suitable for this purpose, such as ‘Slavo-Macedonia’, ‘Vardar-
Macedonia’, ‘NorthernMacedonia’,51 and,more recently, ‘NewMacedonia’,52 among
others.
4. THE LEGAL NATURE OF NAMES AND SYMBOLS
AND THE TRADEMARK ANALOGY
One issue that has not been discussed thus far concerns the legal nature of the dis-
puted name and symbols. More precisely, do they constitute tangible assets in the
sense of real or immovable property, do they resemble financial instruments (such
as bonds and securities), or do they instead perform the functions of intangible
property in the same way as copyright or trademarks? The first two seem clearly to
be too far remote from the object and purpose of the term ‘Macedonia’ and the way
it is used by the two countries, as well as themeaning and feelings it conveys in the
peoples of the two neighbouring states. At the same time, however, it is not possible
wholly to transplant the general principles of copyright and trademark law to re-
solve this legal dispute because of the essentially private law and individualistic –
in terms of creators – outlook of intellectual property. Therefore, in order to make
use of a coherent methodological analogy from the realm of intellectual property
(IP) law, one must necessarily employ only such law that satisfies the following
criteria: (i) that the said law be susceptible to an analogywhereby the object, idea, or
trademark or sign can be seen as belonging to a collectivity under a particular legal
personality (i.e. a state), having, moreover, come to it through historic consequence
or succession, or on the basis of geographic occurrence; (ii) that the trademarkunder
consideration reflect a value, whether financial or other, to the wider group or per-
sons that claim a legal entitlement; and, most importantly, (iii) that the registration
(in any prescribed manner) of the trademark provide the holder with an exclusive
right.
Article 15 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Convention defines as a protectable trademark:
51 See ICG Report, supra note 7, 12–15.
52 This option of ‘New Macedonia’ has reportedly surfaced unofficially following the last round of nego-
tiations between the two countries in February 2008, but no official source has confirmed it. See P.
Karajkov, ‘Macedonia Name Dispute Enters Critical Phase’, 15 April 2008, available at www.newropeans-
magazine.org/content/view/7502/259/.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Mar 2014 IP address: 134.83.1.242
576 ILIAS BANTEKAS
Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services
of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. Such signs, in particular words
including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements [etc.] . . . shall be
eligible for registration as trademarks. Where signs are not inherently capable of
distinguishing therelevantgoodsor services,membersmaymakeregistrabilitydepend
on distinctiveness acquired through use.
From the perspective of the current discussion, it is evident that a trademark –
in this case the appellation ‘Macedonia’ and the ancient Macedonian artefacts used
by FYROM as national symbols – must distinguish a good, service, or product from
other goods, services, or products falling within the same category. Given that the
name ‘Macedonia’ and the symbols are employed by both contesting nations for
the same purposes, it follows that the dual use of the same ‘trademark’ for the
same purpose cannot possibly distinguish the two purposes. It is, therefore, only
reasonable that Article 16(1) of TRIPS confers upon the owner of a registered trade-
mark the exclusive right to
prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of
trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered, where such use would result in
the likelihood of confusion.53
The historical title belonging to Greece, as already explained, would make Greece
the first and exclusive user of the name and symbols. An interesting and viable
analogy is warranted in this connection between the need for registration in IP
law in order for a trademark to be protected and the requirement in international
law that historic title conform to the criteria for producing a customary rule (i.e.
uninterrupted long and consistent use and opinio juris).
Two notable exceptions to this general rule underlie the law of trademarks and
it is only fair that their tenets are further exposed. The first exception rightly posits
that a natural person cannot be prevented from employing his name in order to des-
ignate his personal business, even if this person’s trademark is unregistered. Equally,
someonewith an unregistered trademarkmay prevent others from registering it, or
using it, where that person has been using the particular trademark consistently for
a good amount of time and he is moreover well known for his business activities in
that line of trade. This concept is known as passing-off.54 In the case at hand, the ana-
logy to registration of a trademark, as has already been demonstrated, is tantamount
to long usage of the name and symbols byGreece, without any protest from FYROM
or its predecessors. As a result, the concept of passing-off does not aid the argument
of the latter country, as it has never been known in its modern history by that name
and the same is true of the symbols, which were excavated on Greek territory. The
53 One could alsomakeuse ofArts. 22–24 of TRIPS, relating to the protectionof geographical indications. These
provisions serve to protect indications that identify a good as originating in a particular territory, ‘where
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical
origin’. As will become evident in the next section of this article, the maintenance of the name ‘Macedonia’
in both Greece and FYROM carries with it significant dangers with regard to the designation of products or
services originating in the two countries.
54 See generally Reckitt and Colman Ltd v. Borden Inc, [1990] 1 RPC 344.
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fact that Greece first employed both the name and the symbols for official purposes
reflects the ‘priority right’, which is the highlight of the 1883 Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, now ratified by 171 states, according to which
the filing date of a trademark in a contracting state is considered to be the effective
filing date in another contracting state, provided that another application is filed
within six months.55
As regards, specifically, the use as symbols of historic objects belonging to the
cultural heritage of another state, such as the ancient Macedonian Sun of Vergina
which appeared on the first FYROM flag,56 it is firmly established that their use
for whatever purpose is fully dependent on the consent of the state in whose terri-
tory these are lawfully found.57 This is confirmed by Article 6 of the 1972 UNESCO
Convention for theProtectionofWorldCultural andNaturalHeritage.58 This instru-
ment establishes a legal regimeunderwhich historic and artisticworks and sites are
classified as belonging to a ‘world heritage’.59 The attributes of this regime, however,
are not akin to the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’ under UNCLOS. The
latter does not allow the exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights over the seabed
beneath the high seas, making it clear that this area is reserved for the common use
of all states.60 The concept of ‘world cultural heritage’, on the other hand, under
Article 6 of the 1972Convention, expressly places all historic objects and sites under
the exclusive sovereignty of the holding state and, by implication, this includes the
right to exhibit them or to deny to other entities the use as symbols of such historic
artefacts.
It is hoped that the trademark analogy sheds some light on the particular legal
nature of names and symbols in international law and on the enforceability of the
priority right, which is consonant with the prior in tempore maxim. The following
section focuses on thepotential harm thatmaybe caused as a result of appropriating
symbolsandnamesofa long-termandprioruser, aswell as thepractical implications
such an appropriation might have for the victim state. We shall also employ an
additional facet of international trademark law (although the two are formally
distinct categories of commercial signs), the concept of geographical indications, to
assess whether the protection of such indications is exclusive. This matter, because
of its financial implications, best suits a discussion on damage rather than a section
dealing with an analogy of historic title as a type of trademark.
55 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 4.
56 See supra note 9 and infra note 68.
57 UnderArt. 149ofUNCLOS, all objects of anhistoric or archaeological nature foundon the seabedbeneath the
high seas shall be preserved for the benefit ofmankind, with particular regard paid ‘to the preferential rights
of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of archaeological or historical
origin’. This confirms that the state where such objects are situated exercises exclusive sovereignty over
them, whereas, if not situated on that state’s territory, the lattermay have only sovereign rights of unknown
quantity. By analogy to the present case, Art. 148 confirms that a state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
all historic or cultural elements found on its territory.
58 Adopted 16 November1972, repr. (1972) 11 ILM 1358.
59 Arts. 1 and 2.
60 UNCLOS, Art. 137.
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5. DAMAGE CAUSED TO AND THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE VICTIM STATE: THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATORS PARADIGM
Thus far we have discussed the legal nature of names and symbols in international
law and the possible legal avenues by means of which to determine which state, to
the exclusion of other states, may appropriate these. What remains to be analysed
is the degree of harm or damage, if any, that may be caused to the state with the
exclusive legal entitlement through the use by a state lacking such an entitlement
of the contested name and symbols. If we take it for granted that the usurping
state therefore commits an unlawful act, this would give rise to state responsibility
irrespective of whether damage has been sustained to the title-holder as a result.61
This is so because proof of damage is not a criterion for the determination of such
responsibility.All that is required is evidence that the appropriationof thenameand
symbol does not correspond to an entitlement or an existing lawful obligation.62
Given the international community’s lack of interest in the matter of legal enti-
tlement and historic title, evinced mainly by the fact that a large number of states
havemoved to recognize FYROM as ‘Macedonia’, it is significant to explain onwhat
basis Greece suffers actual damage through the appropriation of this appellation by
FYROM. The trademark analogy employed earlier in this article suggests thatwhere
a state using a particular appellationhas done so for a particularly long time andhas
achieved a reputation associated with such appellation or symbol, it is only logical
that a commercial value attaches to this appellation and symbol. Plainly put, every
successful and well-known trademark possesses a financial dimension other than
any other value that may accrue to it, particularly fame. The same is true of geo-
graphical appellations (‘geographical indications’ in trademark terminology), and
they are protected under relevant multilateral63 and bilateral64 trademark conven-
tions and have, moreover, been the subject of fierce litigation before the European
61 ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 1.
62 Ibid., Art. 16.
63 The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as amended), available at
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html, Arts. 9 and 10, directs member states to seize upon
importationall goodsbearing ‘direct or indirect false indicationsof the sourceof thegoods’.Art. 10bisprohib-
its indications that aremisleading, but does not refer to geographic origin. See S. P. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks
and Related Rights: National and International Protection I–III (1975), 1579. Thereafter, Art. 4 of the 1891Madrid
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indication of Source of Goods (as amended) prohibits
member states from treating regional geographic indications ofwine as generic terms. The strongest protect-
ive measures for geographical indications have, however, come about as a result of Arts. 22–24 of TRIPS, at
the insistence of the EC and Switzerland during theUruguay Round of theGeneral Agreement onTariffs and
Trade (GATT). Art. 22(1) of TRIPS simply states that ‘a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the
good is essentially attributable to’ the product’s place of origin, which could be either a name or a symbol.
There exist two types of protection, one in respect of wines and spirits and a general protection for all other
products. A product is not protected if it is not registered as such in the country of origin (Art. 24(9)), as well
aswhere it involves a generic term in amember state (Art. 24(6)). A. Conrad, ‘The Protection of Geographical
Indications in the TRIPS Agreement’, (1996) 86 Trademark Reporter 11.
64 E.g. 1910 US–Portugal bilateral agreement, whereby the designations ‘Porto’ and ‘Madeira’ were agreed to
be protected in the United States. See Conrad, supra note 63, at 27. The EC has engaged in a tremendous
effort to adopt bilateral agreements in order to phase out the generic use of ECmember states’ geographical
indications. See 1994 EC – Australia on Trade inWine, OJ 2003 L 336/100.
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Court of Justice65 and other courts.66 It is well known that certain geographical
appellations are so famous that the particular product that is produced there is
known not by its type, but by the name of the city or region itself. A few examples
come to mind, such as Champagne and Bordeaux. The European Communities and
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) through its judgments have reiterated that one
need not demonstrate that a product is endowed with exclusive characteristics as
a result of its place of origin, but that the consumer public throughout the world
associates the product with a particular geographical location.67 One can imagine
the confusion and economic loss that would be incurred if a new state named Bor-
deaux emerged in the environs of France and produced wine under the appellation
of Bordeaux. If one follows the argument of FYROM and its supporters one would
come up with the absurd result that the country Bordeaux would not be compelled
to use a compound name, or indeed change its name, in order to distinguish itself
from the region of Bordeaux, which itself has through great pains and over time cre-
ateda successful geographical indication, onwhich it premises itsfinancial viability.
Presumably such a result would be construed on a conclusion that the geographical
indication analogy in international relations is a practical and legal fallacy and that
states have a unilateral legal entitlement to adopt any appellation and symbols,
irrespective of a historic title or continuity, even if to do so would necessarily hurt,
at the very least, long-standing commercial interests of other states. It is more than
obvious that compelling reasons dictate the rejection of such a unilateral entitle-
ment. The Greek province of Macedonia is in its own right well known for its local
delicacies, including cheese andwine, as well as for its tourist industry, a significant
portion of which is precisely centred on ancient Macedonia and its symbols.68 The
ECJ in the Feta II case supported Greek claims that feta cheese receives exclusive
protection as a product of origin as a result, among others, of consumer association
with Greece. More importantly, the Court concurred that in accordance with Greek
legislation, the milk used to make the cheese is only that which is produced in a
specified number of Greek provinces, among which is Macedonia.69 These are just
few, but illustrative, examples of the confusion and subsequent financial loss that
may be caused by the appropriation of a well-known geographical appellation (or
the potential thereof) by another state. Given that all products originating from the
Greek province of Macedonia would fall under protected geographical indications,
it would be devastating for FYROM to be legally precluded from branding its local
65 Following its early case law, the ECJ made it clear that geographical origin would be protected only where
there was a link between particular characteristics of a product produced there and its geographical origin.
As a result it rejected protection in EC Commission v. FRG (Sekt/Weinbrandt), [1975] ECR 181; and in Criminal
Proceedings against Karl Prantl (Bocksbeutel), [1984] ECR 1299.
66 EC v. Australia (Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs),
(2005)WT/DS290/R; on the same subject matter, EC v. USA, (2005)WT/DS174/R.
67 See Exportur SA v. LOR SA and Confiserie du Tech (Exportur case), [1992] ECR I-5529; Belgium v. Spain (Rioja II),
[2000] ECR I-3123; Budejovicky Budvar, Narodni podnik v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH (American Bud), [2003] ECR
I-13617;
68 Thefirst flag of FYROMdisplayed the SunofVergina, an artefact excavated in the ancientMacedonianpalace
at Pellas, Greece. Following Greek protests and international pressure over appropriation of this symbol, the
government of FYROM amended the design, without, however abandoning the Sun.
69 FRG and Denmark v. Commission (Feta II), [2005] ECR I-9115.
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products under the country’s constitutional name. As a matter of state economics,
therefore, it makes sense for FYROM to change its name.
Additional damage may potentially be caused in the sphere of international
cultural heritage law. An obvious problem arising from the use of the same name by
the two states is which of the two, Greece or FYROM, would be entitled to claim the
return of historical or cultural objects related to Macedonia. One may suggest that
thewidespread recognitionofFYROMwith its constitutionalname is adistinct issue
from that of cultural heritage claims, on the basis that the purpose of recognition
was thepreservationof stability, or indeed the recognitionofunilateral entitlements
over a country’s name, whereas the return of cultural treasure should be premised
on historic title. The denial of historical evidence, however, in one circumstance
and its acceptance in another brings to mind neo-imperialistic connotations that
can only help to fuel criticisms that international law is inconsistent. Indeed, if a
petitioned state were to return archaeological artefacts to Greece under the premise
that they form part of the ancient Macedonian heritage that was exclusively Greek,
howwould the samepetitioned entity explain its refusal to return the same artifacts
to FYROM, where it has recognized FYROM as Macedonia, given that this country
claims strong historical links with ancient Macedonians? It is obvious that this
instance cannot be justified and has the potential to inflame serious international
friction.Historical claims, therefore, have a significantbearingon legal entitlements
and cannot be divorced from them.
This conflict over the name could also have implications regarding laws granting
nationality, as Greece exercises the jus sanguinis principle of nationality, which is
basedondescent fromanational. Thiswouldaffectpeoplewhohave livedabroad for
a number of generations under a Macedonian upbringing and whose predecessors
took for granted their Greek ethnicity, as would be the case with any emigrant from
London to the United States who need not emphasize that he or she is thereby
from the United Kingdom.70 People in these particular circumstances are bound
to encounter a substantial amount of confusion in identifying their ancestral land,
especially where they have taken up the language of their current abode and have
no links with the country of origin of their ancestors.71
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the legal arguments referred to in this art-
icle are useful before judicial bodies, particularly the International Court of Justice
and ad hoc arbitration, were the parties to decide to settle their dispute through
judicial means. Equally, these conclusions would empower non-judicial settlement
in the event that the appointed entitywas empowered to formulate a legal argument
and bring it to the attention of the parties. In the absence of any of these mechan-
isms, it is maybe wishful thinking to expect that the party with the weakest legal
70 The ICJ in theNottebohm case, supra note 6, 20–1, confirmed that although each state is free to determine the
conferment of nationality on the basis of its own laws, it is international law that determineswhether a state
is entitled to exercise related functions, such as diplomatic protection.
71 This is particularly important, since it affects possible land and voting rights which some states grant to
persons belonging to the ethnic population of the state. Under Art. 6 of the Greek Citizenship Code (Law
No. 2130/1993) persons of Greek descent are not required to have resided in Greece for any period of time
in order to apply for citizenship, as is required for other foreign nationals. See Z. Papasiopi-Pasia, The Law of
Citizenship (1994, in Greek), 46.
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arguments would entertain them before any forum. Legal arguments are, nonethe-
less, simply one part of this particular equation. The international community is
right to be concernedwith the stability of FYROM, particularly given its diverse eth-
nic composition. It is also right in helping this country to shape its identity without
causing friction in the process, particularly where long-running sentiments of ad-
jacent nations are at stake. It is, however, simplistic and without political, social,
or moral merit to argue that the underdog should enjoy an advantage it does not
deserve, on the sole basis of its underdog status, while disregarding the claims and
sentiments of its opponents. Such policies breed resentment, mistrust, and conflict.
The international community needs to sensitize itself to such sentiments and take
them into serious consideration. We have seen how during the period of coloniza-
tion the colonizers exercised a divide-and-rule strategy in carving up various parts
of the world and providing a loose or false identity to the local populations, at a
time when these populations had never conceived the limitations of boundaries
or national identities. The results of these actions, such as the artificial division by
the Belgians of the Hutu and the Tutsi in the Tanganyika region and the carving
up of the Arab world by the British, to name just two, were catastrophic and their
consequences are evident to this day.
6. CONCLUSION
There is little optimism that legal means are intended to be utilized to resolve the
dispute over thename ‘Macedonia’, unless the twoparties decide to extend their cur-
rent ICJ dispute in respect of the 1995 InterimAgreement to cover the real issue: the
dispute over the name ‘Macedonia’. To those who have given scant attention to the
legal merits of the dispute, it was no surprise that the supposed absence of a general
rule gave rise to aunilateral entitlement touse any appellationor symbol. Following
close inspection, however, it is at leastmore obvious that any unilateral entitlement
must take heed of prior state practice, particularly opposing practice. The weight of
historical evidenceclearly suggests thatGreecepossesseshistoric titleover thename
‘Macedonia’ and the ancientMacedonian symbols excavated on its territory, since it
has used the name ‘Macedonia’ for constitutional purposes long before it was ever
introduced in the SFRY.Whether or not the first user’s entitlement is tantamount to,
or analogous with, entitlements deriving from discovery is something that was not
pursued in this article, but there is no apparent reason why the same legal regime
cannot find application in the present case. A combination of historic title and con-
tinuous state practice has given rise to an exclusive legal entitlement on the basis
of the maxim prior in tempore potior in jure. Why the entitlement is exclusive, rather
than concurrent, was answered, in addition, by reference to analogies from the law
of trademarks and that of geographical indications. The first demonstrates that the
first user possesses an exclusive entitlement, save where a concurrent user is well
known or has made use of the trade for a considerable amount of time, without
having, however, registered it. The international law of geographical indications
is in fact applied without the need for analogy. We argue that the assumption of
FYROM’s constitutional name would create substantial problems for the country’s
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export potential, since the Greek province ofMacedonia has already secured a large
number of local products as products of origin. As a result, FYROM’s productswould
have to be renamedwith a distinctive compound, a fact that negates the very reason
for retaining its constitutional name of Macedonia.
This article has examined some legal avenues in order to explain the entitlement
to aname in international law. The legal issues shouldnot obfuscate political reality,
but, equally, political intentions should not inflame tensions and cause injustice. In
the present case, injusticewould be servedwhere historical truth is ignored but also
where the international community fails to preserve peace and stability in FYROM.
Equally, Greecemust place viable alternatives on the negotiating table and promote
as far as possible the financial and other interests of FYROM before international
institutions. Inanyevent, thematter is inneedof immediateresolutionandalthough
the parties have set as their goal a diplomatic solution through the use ofmediation,
they should certainly consider subjecting their dispute to the International Court
of Justice.
